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INTRODUCTION:
THE PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: SOLVING THE CRISIS OF PROFESSIONALISM, OR LEGITIMATING THE STATUS QUO?
MARY JOE FRUG t

HIS YEAR THE LEGAL PROFESSION HAS BEEN OFFERED three proposals to revise the current rules regulating
lawyer conduct.' In order to facilitate informed consideration of
these proposals within the profession, the Editors of the Villanova
Law Review invited distinguished representatives from each of
the professional groups that have submitted suggested revisions
to discuss the proposals. In this introduction to the Symposium
that follows, my objective is to identify three issues that'I think
are germane to this endeavor, but which have not yet received
candid and thorough attention. These issues are, first, why do
members of the profession feel it necessary to revise the current
rules now, only a dozen years after their adoption? Second, is this
attempt at self-regulation politically or practically sound? And
finally. how well, if at all, do the current proposals tackle the problems the revised rules should address? It is my thesis that the
proposals to revise the profession's ethical rules have been prompted
primarily by a crisis in the legitimacy of professionalism, a crisis
that threatens to undermine the current role of the legal profession
in the social order. I am skeptical that any attempt at self-regulation can solve a crisis of such proportions, and my skepticism is
buttressed by the current proposals. The changes that have been
proposed mask, rather than resolve, the crisis of professionalism,
t- Professor of Law, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts.
At the time of her participation in this Symposium, Professor Frug was Professor of Law at the Villanova University School of Law.
1. The current code of ethics is the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY

(1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA

CODE],

which has been adopted

in whole or in substantial part throughout the United States.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

29 (1976).

See A.

The proposed

revisions are the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
(Kutak Commission), MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion
Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES]; the Roscoe PoundAmerican Trial Lawyers Foundation Commission on Professional Responsibility
PUBLIC DISCUSSION

DRAFT, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CoNDUcr (June,

1980) [hereinafter cited as ATLA CODE]; and the National Organization of
Bar Counsel, REPoRr AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON STUDY OF THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (August 2, 1980) [hereinafter cited as NOBC REPORT].

(1121)
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presumably in a deliberate effort to preserve the status quo for the
legal profession.
1. WHY IS THE PROFESSION REVISING ITS CURRENT

RULES?

Professionalism may be defined as role-differentiated behavior,
reinforced by ethical, political and psychological attitudes considered particularly appropriate to accomplish the specialized tasks
of a group's work. 2 While many factors, including education, peer
socialization, client expectations, and one's own moral universe,
contribute to an individual's sense of professionalism, a code of
ethics plays a major role in announcing, enforcing, and legitimating conduct that would be considered inappropriate in one's nonworking role.3 Thus, the problems that are found in a profession's code of ethics may signal similar problems in the profession
itself. Correspondingly, any disagreement about the problems to
be solved in the profession would have serious implications for any
proposed ethical reforms.
In my opinion, the reason for the revision of the current
Code is the same as the reason for its adoption in 1969, in place
of the Canons of Ethics, and the reason for the adoption of the
Canons themselves in 1908. Historically, the profession can trace
the development of each of its formal codes to a crisis of the social
order and the complicity of. lawyers in that crisis. 4 Thus, the
Canons grew out of the revolt against unregulated industrialization in the United States. Public attention was focused on the
vigorous efforts lawyers were making to help their corporate clients
evade regulatory legislation, forcing lawyers to adopt in self defense
a body of ethical rules.5 Similarly, consideration of the current
Code of Professional Responsibility was initiated in 1964, when
mounting dissatisfaction with inequality in the social order and
the inadequacies of our justice system began to include criticism
of lawyers for their efforts to preserve the status quo. 6 In each
2. An illuminating discussion of the concept of role-differentiation is found
in

Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5

RIGHTS 1 (1975).

HUMAN

For discussions of the characteristics of a profession, see

W. MooRE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 9-16 (1970);

Parsons, "Pro-

fessions," in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 536 (1968).
3. For a discussion of factors which cause an individual to identify with
his profession, see Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional

Mask, 64 VA. L REV. 735 (1978); Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession:
Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MiCn. L. REv.

1111 (1978).
4. See J. AUERBACH,
5. Id. at 40-42.
6. Id.

UNEQUAL JUSTICE

40-42, 285-88 (1976).

at 285-88; Auerbach, What has the Teaching of Law to do with

Justice?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 463 (1978).
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case the profession adopted new ethical codes when society became
unwilling to condone behavior by lawyers that it had declared
inappropriate for non-lawyers. In each situation the new ethical
code excused what lawyers were doing by demonstrating, in written
form, that their conduct was required by the special rules of the
profession. It wasn't that lawyers especially liked Robber Barrons,
recalcitrant schoolboards, or the Ku Klux Klan, but even despicable
individuals have a right to at least "one champion against a hostile
8
world." 7 Their codes said so.
Neither code fully articulated a theory that explained why
the particular legal order required role-differentiated conduct for
lawyers, although theories have since been suggested that attempt
to defend the special rules. 9 Moreover, neither the Canons nor the
Code of Professional Responsibility was responsive to the social
crisis from which each originated. The Canons did not require
corporate lawyers to mitigate their zealous efforts on behalf of their
clients, but cracked down hard on the unrelated, though questionable practices of individual lawyers - "ambulance chasers" and
the like.' 0 Similarly, the Code of Professional Responsibility did
not require lawyers to reform the social order, but very gingerly

and niggardly allowed lawyers to work for equal justice, as long
as they complied with a number of inhibiting restrictions." Each
new code, however, warded off fundamental changes in the underlying social order by adopting a new set of rules that not only
diverted attention from the crisis that had prompted rule reform
but relied on an unarticulated vision of a special role of lawyers
2
in supporting the current legal order.'
7. M.

FREEDMAN,

LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY

SYSTEM

4 (1975).

8. ABA CODE, supra note 1, EC 2-26, EC 2-27, EC 2-28; DR 7-106(c)(4).
See generally Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 30.
9. E.g., Fried, THE LAWYER As FRIEND: THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF
LAWYER CLIENT RELATION, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
For an overview of

plausible theories, see generally Simon, supra note 8. Working out a theory
of legal professionalism is an ongoingeffort among scholars. See, e.g., Postema,
Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63 (1980);
Kaufman, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1504 (1981).

10. J.

AUERBACH,

supra note 4, at 42-44.

11. E.g., ABA CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-101, DR 2-102 (rules restricting
distribution of information about legal services), DR 2-103(D)(4) (restricting
group sponsored distribution of legal service), DR 5-103 (restricting lawyer
contribution to litigation cost).
12. William Simon provides a fascinating and thorough articulation of
this vision and the correlated view of law on which it relies. Simon,
suipra note 8.
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The crisis in the social order that gives rise to current attempts
to revise the Code is comparable in some respects to the issues that
gave rise to the Canons and Code - lawyers are under attack for
their amorality. 13 Why should lawyers representing a criminal
defendant fail to tell parents of missing children that they know
where the children's bodies are located. 14 Why should a lawyer
help a rich client resist paying a debt to a poor lender? ", What
moral arguments can a lawyer make to justify results that seem
immoral? Formerly, lawyers have been able to justify conduct that
would seem wrong if undertaken by non-lawyers by linking their
role-differentiated conduct to the vindicating requirements of the
law. The current crisis in the legitimacy of professionalism, however, is an unwillingness to excuse lawyer conduct on the professional rationale that the group's special relationship to the legal
order requires such conduct. In my view, such unwillingness is
rooted in a deep dissatisfaction with the legal order itself.
Unlike the crises that prompted earlier rule changes, the current crisis is not limited to a single question of social reform.
Widespread criticism abounds of most of our major institutions
today. Government services, such as the public schools and administrative regulation, not only fail to meet expectations but seem
worse than they used to be. Private institutions, from the flailing
automakers to the American family itself, seem progressively inefficient and corrupt. In the past, the legal order has been partially
immunized from criticism of social institutions because of a protective aura of neutrality. But we are now in a critical period of
legal history in which the law is losing its claim to neutrality and
13. E.g., J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978). Acknowledging that
many observers attribute public contempt for lawyers to the fact that they have
failed to abide by their own, self-professed principles, Lieberman contends
instead "that the public contempt for lawyers stems rather from their adherence
to an unethical code of ethics", a thesis which he sets out to prove in his book.
Id. at 15-16.
14. This question arises from the facts of a widely celebrated incident in
Lake Pleasant, New York. Lawyers who had learned that their client had
committed murders other than that of which he was accused and for which the
attorneys were representing him, refused to answer questions from one of the
additional victim's parents when they came to the lawyers seeking information
about their missing child. These lawyers' staunch protection of the client's
confidence was authorized by the Code supra note 1,in DR 4-101, and was
vindicated by the courts when New York prosecutors brought an action claiming that disclosure was mandated by a state public health law requiring that
deaths be reported. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798
(Onondaga County Ct.), aff'd mem., 50 A.D.2d 1088, 276 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975),
aff'd per curiam, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
15. This question arises from the facts of the case of Zabella v. Pakel, 242
F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957), cited in Fried, supra note 9, at 1064, n.13. Zabeila is
discussed in Postema, supra note 9, at 66.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss6/2

4

Frug: The Proposed Revisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility

1980-81]

INTRODUCTION

1125

certainty. 16 The legal order is increasingly accused of sustaining,
cultivating, and nourishing our festering institutions. 7 Lawyers,
therefore, who help these institutions navigate their course through
the supporting legal structure are inevitably included in the public's
mounting criticism. Thus, the crisis in the legitimacy of professionalism that I believe is prompting current efforts to revise our
Code consists of the failure to believe that the laws require special
rules of conduct for lawyers, a failure that derives from a collapse
of confidence in the laws themselves.
In order to alleviate such a crisis, lawyers would need to draft
rules articulating with heretofore unprecedented specificity the
nature of a lawyer's special relationship to the law. Moreover,
until lawyers could persuade themselves and others that the laws
and the legal processes that they serve are morally defensible, they
would not be able to justify their special rules of conduct. Consequently, in order to surmount the crisis in the legitimacy of
professionalism, lawyers would also need to accomplish the Herculean assignment of addressing grave issues within the legal order
which are troubling lawyer and non-lawyer alike, issues such as
the nature of equality and of justice.
Twice before, the profession has defused criticism of lawyer
conduct stemming from. dissatisfaction with an aspect of the social
order by formulating -fresh articulations of the same old rules.
Such diversionary, apologetic tactics have shored up the profession
and averted change in the social order. There is some indication
that a similar strategy is under way again in the current revision
efforts. Evidence for such a strategy can be found in the radically
narrow way some define the nature of the crisis that demands revision of the current Code.
This narrow view is that the Code of Professional Responsibility
is in need of revision simply because of its widely noted failure to
shoulder its responsibility to announce and enforce the elements
of legal professionalism. The crisis of professionalism, in this
view, is a weakened sense, among individual lawyers, of what conduct is expected of them in their work and a corresponding drop
in the profession's strength and respectability.'
Once the prob16. R. UNGER, LAW AND MODERN SocIETY 192-223 (1976).
17. See G. Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059
(1980); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 205 (1979).
18. The Chairman of the ABA Commission which has promulgated the
Model Rules has advanced this view. Kutak, Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 36 Bus. LAw. 573, 574-76 (1981).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 6 [1981], Art. 2

1126

VILLANOVA

[VOL. 26: p. l1121

LAW REVIEW

lem is so defined, it is not hard to find plausible evidence to
document it.
For example, the first decade of the Code's existence has been
marked by an unprecedented series of judicial decisions that have
invalidated rules restricting lawyers' abilities to charge less than
set minimum fees,' 9 to advertise, 20 to talk to the press about ongoing cases, 21 to solicit clients, "2 and to monopolize the delivery
of legal services. 23 As long as these individual rules are not replaced, the Code's ability to guide lawyers' conduct is diminished.
Other aspects of recent history have also exposed deficiencies
in the Code's informational and enforcement functions. Trying
hard to disassociate from the lawyers who participated in Watergate and other abuses of public office, 24 the bar urged law schools
to require ethical instruction for all law students, and many complied.2 5 While requiring instruction in legal ethics moved the
Code into academic respectability, 26 it also encouraged substantially
increased scrutiny, yielding thus far a large body of legal literature which criticizes the Code's failure to provide rules that adequately address and resolve the problems of modern legal func19. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
20. Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
21. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
22. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). But see In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). For a discussion of Ohralik and Primus, see
Note, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 185 (1978).
23. Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or. 552, 538 P.2d 913 (1975); but see
State Bar v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W.2d 1 (1976); Florida Bar v.
Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978).
24. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 299-306; Watson, Watergate Lawyer
Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency Disease, 26 J. LEGAL EDUc. 441 (1974)
(linking Watergate to legal education in the adversary system). For an elegant
essay gently deriding the attention Watergate focused on lawyers, see Freund,
The Moral Education of the Lawyer, 26 EMORY L.J. 3 (1977).

25. See generally Pre-Conference Materials, 1977

NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

Goldberg ed. 1977)
(survey of American Law schools and their treatment of legal ethics); M. KELLY,
MONOGRAPH ON THE TEACHING OF ETHICS II, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION (The Hastings Center, 1980). In 1974 the ABA amended its standards for
legal education to include as a mandatory requirement preparation in professional responsibility, ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
302(a)(iii), ratification reported in Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 60
A.B.A.J. 1207, 1213 (1974).
26. See generally M. KELLY, supra note 24. For a sampling of legal profession case books published after the ABA amended its accreditation
standards, see, e.g., R. ARONSON, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1978); A. KAUFMAN, supra note 1; T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (1976); N. REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL
ON

TEACHING

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

RESPONSIBILITY: A PROBLEM APPROACH
LEGAL PROFESSION (1979).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss6/2

(1976);

vii-xlvi (S.

M. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE

6

Frug: The Proposed Revisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
1980-81]

1127
1

INTRODUCTION

tions.2 7 The Code's failure to offer guidance for counselors and
negotiators and for lawyers working in bureaucratic settings has
been noted. 28 Its failure to provide definitive solutions for com29
mon conflicts of competing rules has been widely discussed.
Neither informational deficiencies created by judicial invalidation of current rules nor the inadequacies in coverage exposed by
recent academic work in professional responsibility are defensible.
They weaken the profession's ability to achieve uniform and consistent role-differentiated behavior among its members. However,
similar inadequacies in the informational capacities of ethical rules
have never before been sufficient to galvanize the development of
new rules.3 0 More importantly, a reform effort that concentrates
on eliminating inexactitudes, extending coverage, and mitigating
apparent conflicts in the ethical rules serves as a ploy to avoid
change in the present structure of legal services and to preserve
the prevailing legal order.
II. Is

SELF-REGULATION

POLITICALLY

Adopting a special set of
has long been a characteristic
The bar's current attempt to
rules might, therefore, appear

OR PRACTICALLY SOUND?

rules to regulate its own members
attribute of a professional group. 81
develop and approve new ethical
to represent no more than the le-

27. A selective sampling of the vast amount of literature generated by the
Code includes: Bellow & Kettleson, The Problem of Fairness: Public Interest
Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978); Frankel, Review, Code of Professional
Responsibility, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874 (1976); Leubsdorf, Communicating
with Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interest, 127

U. PA. L. REV. 683 (1979); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REv. 702 (1977).
28. E.g.,;Marquis, An Appraisal of Attorney's Responsibilities Before Ad-

ministrative Agencies, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285 (1976); Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978).
29. Schwartz, supra note 28, at 669. See generally, G. HAzARDU, ETHICS IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); Greenbaum, Attorneys' Problems in Making
Ethical Decisions, 52 IND. L. REV. 285 (1976); Sevilla, Between Scylla and
Charybdis: The Ethical Perils of the Criminal Defense Lawyer 2 NAT. J. CRIM.
DEF. 237 (1976)

30. The gaps in the current Code are no more serious than earlier
deficiences. For more than one-and-a-half centuries prior to the 1908 Canons
of Ethics, American lawyers got along without the specific guidance of model
rules. Despite substantial changes in legal work created by the rise of the
administrative state during the thirties, lawyers were left with as little guidance
for their professional conduct as lawyers now have, but reform efforts were
still unsuccessful. See Preface, 1969 FINAL DRAFr ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY

reprinted in

AMERICAN

BAR FOUNDATION,

ANNOTATED

CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, XV-XVi (1979).

31. W. MOORE, supra note 2.
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gal profession's natural exercise of its undisputed communal right
of self-government. If so, the only serious question to consider
regarding self-regulation would be which group, among those proposing code revisions, best represents the profession: the American
Bar Association, the American Trial Lawyers Association, or the
National Organization of Bar Counsel.
Even the question of which organization should speak for the
whole profession in the revision enterprise is not an easy one.
Although the American Bar Association drafted both the Canons
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, it only represents
approximately half of the nation's lawyers.3 2 Moreover, since the
adoption of the Code in 1969, not only has the size of the profession
doubled, 38 but the organization of law practice has been changed
by the increased size of the groups in which lawyers work, and by
the development of new forms of delivery mechanisms, such as legal
clinics.3 4 The increase in size and diversity of the legal profession
makes it unlikely that any one organization can adequately speak
for all lawyers.
More significantly, even if one of the organizations proposing
reforms were able to claim legitimacy by persuading the appropriate
authorities to adopt its revision, many lawyers would pay little
attention to any of the changes which were not vigorously enforced.
The efficacy of an ethical code is related to the cohesion of the
professional group and the influence the organization has on its
individual members.3 5 The more closely individuals identify with
a professional group, the more they are likely to accept and internalize the group's rules as standards without the necessity of
exercising enforcement procedures and sanctions.3 6 Conversely, the
more individuals feel alienated and separate from their professional
group, the more they are likely to view the group's standards as
rules which "they" are imposing on the individuals. Thus, the
very existence of competing organizations seeking to articulate
standards for the profession as a whole, coupled with the tenuous
32. In 1979, outgoing ABA President S. Shepard Tate reported ABA
membership at 250,000. 65 A.B.A.J. 1133 (August, 1979). The 1977 lawyer
and judge population was 462,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 419 (1978).
33. See Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 TEX.
L. REV. 1269, 1269-71 (1980).
34. Id. at 1270-77.
35. E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETICS AND CIVIC MORALS 6-8 (C. Brookfield trans. 1958).
36. Id. at 7-9.
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nature of the members' allegiance to those various organizations,
suggests that effective self-regulation is not a practical possibility.
This weakness in the legal profession's capacity for self-regulation is not new. Indeed, because of the legal profession's obvious
ties to the legal system, its attempts at fully autonomous selfdiscipline have always been limited by participation of the courts
and the legislatures in the regulation of lawyer conduct. Because
the involvement of lawyers is crucial to the courts' operation,
lawyer qualifications and conduct are considered subject to the
judicial branch's inherent authority to protect its own functioning,
its dignity, and its existence.3 7 Accordingly, in most jurisdictions, the legal profesison's ethical rules are adopted by and
enforced through sanctions imposed by the highest court of the
particular jurisdiction. 38 In addition, state legislatures have enacted legislation purporting to authorize courts to adopt rules
regulating lawyer conduct, such as the Code of Professional Responsibility,3 9 and have also enacted legislation regulating such
aspects of law practice as advertising and solicitation of clients.40
Thus, the profession has traditionally been limited in its powers
of self-regulation by governmental controls on the bar imposed by
judicial and legislative action. Historically, the bar has provided
both the incentive for adoption and the substantive content of
these regulations. However, during the past decade, legislative
regulation of lawyers has substantially increased 4' and judicial
supervision of professional conduct has proved less susceptible to
the bar's influence.4
The increase in independent government
regulation has significant implications for the profession's expec37. Comment, Separation of Powers: Who Should Control the Bar? 47
J. URB. L. 715 (1969); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate
the Practice of Law, 60 MINN. L. REv. 783, 785 (1976).
38. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT,

PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT

10-23 (1970).
39. See Note, supra note 37, at 798.
40. 1979 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 180-82.
41. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, supra note 29, at 16-17; Tunney & Frank, Federal

Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L. REV. 333 (1975).
42. For an example, compare the lengthy recommendations for amending
the Pennsylvania Code of Responsibility's advertising regulations in which the
Philadelphia Bar Association suggested adoption of ABA proposal B, set out
in REPORT OF THE ABA PROPOSALS TO AMEND CANON 2 OF THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY,

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

OF

BAR ASSOCIATION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,

THE

as

PHILADELPHIA

amended, Sep-

tember 28, 1977, with the rules adopted without comment by the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court, reported in 7 PA. BULL. 1269 (1977). (A copy of the Philadelphia Bar Association's Report is on file in the Villanova Law Library).
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tations regarding self-regulation, for it not only has directly
diminished the profession's control over its own members, but it
has conditioned lawyers to look beyond the profession's own rules
to other sources for complete guidance in matters of conduct.
These limits on the legal profession's ability to engage in
self-regulation are based on the inherent difficulties in any attempts at self-government. At least three reasons traditionally
have been offered to justify self-regulation. First, self-regulation
historically has furthered the economic monopoly that the bar,
like other professions and their guild predecessors, has characteristically maintained.48 Second, self-regulation has restricted the
task of judging a lawyer's exercise of specialized knowledge to
44
those who are familiar with the information and skills involved.
Finally, self-regulation has reinforced the profession's identity by
differentiating its members in their professional capacity from the
45
rest of society.
I cannot say whether there is a consensus among members
of the legal profession which supports these objectives today. I
doubt it. It is clear, however, that many non-lawyers have begun
to oppose the profession's economic protectivism, just as they
increasingly object to concentration of power in the federal government and in giant corporations. Moreover, consumers of legal
services have begun to assert an interest in influencing decisions
about the delivery of these services that parallels the claims they
are asserting more generally to participate in decision-making elsewhere in society. 46 Finally, the crisis of professionalism discussed
above indicates that both lawyers and non-lawyers are increasingly
unwilling to permit the profession, through self-regulation, to
47
stand apart from the standards society establishes for itself.
It may be that social pressures opposing self-regulation are
no greater than they have been before, and that adopting a new
code will convince people, as it has in the past, that the profession is adequately patrolling its own borders. But the legal
profession's ability to ward off regulation by outsiders, if it still
exists, cannot excuse lawyers from confronting the problems of
continued self-regulation. The questions posed by the revision of
43. See, J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 13, at 68-106.
44. See id. at 218.

45. See id. at 45-54.
46. See Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation
of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1978).

47. See Simon, supra note 8.
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the rules affecting lawyer conduct should raise issues in which all
society has a legitimate interest - questions such as how the delivery of legal services can be altered so that justice is no longer
predicated on the amount of money spent, or how the legal system can be restructured to eliminate procedural injustice.
Like non-lawyers, many lawyers are offended by the perversion of representative democracy that occurs when a special interest group is able to exercise disproportionate influence to lobby
proposed legislation into law. It is no less offensive for an organization that does not claim all lawyers in its membership to
persuade the judiciary to adopt its revision of rules regulating
lawyer conduct. Since these rules determine how lawyers serve
their clients, and since how lawyers serve their clients in turn
influences the structure of society, it would seem apparent that the
issues involved in the revision project deserve consideration and
deliberation by a wider portion of society than the current attempt
at self-regulation permits.
III.

EVALUATING THE PROPOSED REVISIONS

In the Symposium that follows this essay, able representatives
of the American Bar Association 48 and the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Association,49 as proponents of two new code
proposals, concentrate their debate on the manner in which their
suggested ethical codes attempt to resolve the fundamental conflict lawyers experience between a duty of confidentiality to their
clients and a duty of candor toward the courts. This issue generates such controversy that it can easily foreclose a thoroughgoing
evaluation of the proposed revisions in their entirety as well as
consideration of the objectives the revisions seek to further. But
even analyzing how each revision treats this one particular issue
reveals the apologetic nature of each proposal.
In their suggested code, the American Trial Lawyers assume
that whoever serves a client by preserving his confidences automatically and unavoidably serves the court. That's the adversary
system as the American Trial Lawyers view it, and they don't
want to change it. Professor Freedman even asserts it would be
48. McKay, In Support of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 26 VILL. L. REv. 1137 (1981).

49. Freedman, The Kutak Model Rules v. The American Lawyer's Code
of Conduct, 26 VILL. L REv. 1105 (1981).
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unconstitutional to change it, arguing that a client's right to effective assistance of counsel would "whipsaw" his right not to incriminate himself if his lawyer were permitted or required to reveal certain confidences.5 0 This argument stoutly ignores the
indeterminacy of the constitutional rights on which it relies; 5it
assumes that the proper role of a lawyer is to be her client's tool
and then defines the constitutional right to a lawyer's assistance
to be consistent with that assumption. The American Trial Lawyer's proposed code thus solves the crisis in the legitimacy of professionalism by denying it. Their code reaffirms the necessity for
lawyers to behave differently from non-lawyers, relying on a rationale
of the client's need for professional loyalty. Their confidence that
such a system would redound to the public benefit itself relies on
a formalistic view of the nature of law. Lawyers, according to
the ATLA code, must act the way they do because the law commands them to do so.
Unlike the American Trial Lawyers Association, the American Bar Association in its code proposal implicitly acknowledges a
crisis of professionalism, but its efforts to mitigate the crisis consist
primarily of several proposals to extend the ethical rules to cover
relationships and aspects of law practice that are omitted in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the ABA's Model
Rules discuss situations where the demands of client loyalty are
uncertain, specifying a lawyer's duties when her client is an organization rather than an individual, 52 a lawyer's duty to a client
who suffers a disability, 53 and the responsibilities of a lawyer acting in either a supervisory 54 or a subordinate capacity to another
lawyer.5 5 Rules are also proposed to regulate a lawyer's conduct
towards a client outside of a trial, such as when she advises 5 6 or
evaluates a matter for a client,5 7 when she is engaged in negotia50. Id. at 1171-72.
51. See, e.g., Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing,
and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REv. 464, 485-86 (1977); see also
Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF.
L. REv. 1961 (1978).

52.

MODEL

RuLES, supra note 1, Rule 1.13.

53. Id. at Rule 1.14.

54. Id. at Rule 7.2.
55. Id. at Rule 7.3.
56. Id. at Rule 2.4.
57. Id. at Rules 6.1, 6.3.
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tions5 8 when she acts as intermediary between parties5 9 and
when she serves as an advocate in a non-adjudicatory proceeding.60
Similarly, changes in the structure of law practice are acknowledged
6l
and addressed by a new non-regulatory approach to advertising
and solicitation, 2 and by condoning professional relationships between non-lawyers and lawyers. 63
Including more lawyers and more of their activities under the
umbrella of the profession's ethical rules may ameliorate the alienation which many lawyers have experienced from their profession.
This in turn could discourage criticism within the profession that
contributes to the lack of confidence in the professionalism rationale,
and it could dissuade lawyers from abandoning self-regulation.
However, these changes, by concentrating on the informational
problems of the current Code, neglect the more serious issue of the
Code's inability to defend role-differentiation.
The ABA does attempt to deal with some of the concerns
which provoke non-lawyers about the profession, proposing, for
example, a series of rules which invigorate a lawyer's obligation
to consult fully and openly with her client in a wide range of
matters.64 Concerns that, under current rules, lawyers can exploit
their special knowledge of the laws to the disadvantage of the
courts are also addressed through new rules that strengthen a lawyer's obligation to expedite, rather than delay litigation, 5 and to
exercise diligence in law practice. 6
These outwardly focused
changes in the ABA's proposed rules, if adopted, might avoid both
further consumer pressure to intervene in the profession's selfgovernment processes and increased judicial or legislative regulation.
However, as with the informational changes discussed above, none
of the changes confronts the crucial issue undermining legal professionalism - the claim that lawyers act amorally by pursuing tech-

nically lawful client objectives which society considers immoral.
58. Id. at Rule 4.2.
59. Id. at Rules 5.1-5.2.
60. Id. at Rule 3.12.

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at Rule 9.2.
Id. at Rule 9.3.
Id. at Rules 7.4-7.5.
Id. at Rule 1.4 (Adequate Communication); Rule 1.6 (Fees); Rule 1.9

(Prohibited Relationships Affecting a Lawyer and Client); Rule 4.1 (Disclosures to a Client During Negotiations).
65. Id. at Rule 3.3.
66. Id. at Rule 1.5.
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The American Bar Association flirts with the disparity between the law and morality that constitutes a major part of the
crisis in the legitimacy of professionalism. Unlike the American
Trial Lawyers Association, the ABA does not hide its head in the
sand by absolutely implying that all lawful objectives are moral.
It acknowledges that this is not so, by permitting a lawyer to act
according to his or her own sense of what is right in several significant instances. But there is very little support for the lawyer's
decision to act morally in the ABA's proposed rules. There is
no general requirement that a lawyer should serve justice over
law.6 7 Nor is there any suggestion how reliance on individual
morality, no matter what it might be, will strengthen the ethical
foundation of the profession's conduct.
The ABA's evasion of the basic ethical problems confronting
lawyers can be demonstrated by returning to the issue of the conflict
between honoring a client's confidence and protecting the integrity
of the court. Although the ABA proposal forbids lawyers from
offering false evidence to a tribunal in a civil matter and purportedly requires them to violate a client's confidence in order to
rectify such an offering, 8 critical exception is made for the lawyer
representing a defendant in a criminal case.0 9 In this instance, the
ABA declines to resolve the crucial issue, stating that a lawyer
must comply with a client's request to offer false evidence if "applicable law requires." 70 But the law is uncertain. 71 Thus, individual lawyers are permitted to reveal a client's confidence in
order to fulfill a higher duty to the court and they are also permitted to balance the question in favor of the client. In either
case, absent guidance from their profession on how to make this
67. E.g., Rule 1.16, regulating termination of representation, requires
termination if the lawyer's conduct is illegal, but only permits termination if
the client's conduct is illegal or unjust; Model Rule 2.2 permits, but does not
require, a lawyer to discuss moral and ethical considerations relevant to a
client's concerns "unless it is evident that the client desires advice confined to
strictly legal considerations." Id. Model Rule 2.4 requires a lawyer to "warn"
a client contemplating conduct with "serious legal consequences" but this duty
too is mitigated if the client "expressly or by implication asks not to receive
such advice." Id. Model Rules 3.5 and 3.6 introduce regulations for conduct
of lawyers in ex parte proceedings or proceedings in which the adversary is
unrepresented, but both rules adopt the law rather than the individual's sense
of justice as the guiding standards.
68.

MODEL RuLEs,

supra note I, at Rules 3.l(a)(b).

69. Id. at Rule 3.(f)(1), (3).
70. Id.
71. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
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decision, lawyers can rely on their profession's ethical rules to
disguise their choice as "law".
The ABA would also permit lawyers to reveal a client's intent to commit a "deliberately wrongful act,". 72 allowing individuals to avoid the guilt that role differentiated behavior might have
brought them, were they to follow the profession's confidentiality
rules, as well as promoting greater public trust in the morality of
some members of the profession. However, as Professor Freedman
astutely observes, once clients know that a conscientious lawyer
does not protect confidences, those confidences may either be withheld or they may be taken to someone the clients can trust.73 Making morality discretionary rather than mandatory thus places an
economic and professional price tag on one's ethical decisions. Since
only lawyers who can afford to alienate future clients will also be
able to afford this newly permitted morality, the permission the
Model Rules grant is likely to be more illusory than real.
It might be argued that under the current Code of Professional
Responsibility a lawyer's duty to represent a client zealously is so
exacting that a lawyer could exercise his individual moral judgment only at his peril. Under the proposed ABA revisions, the
lawyer would be assured that the cost of exercising that moral judgment would not include his disbarment or censure by his peers.
Taking this view of the current Code might make the ABA revision
seem like a step forward. It at least avoids the path taken by the
American Trial Lawyers, whose proposed revision of the Code
exacerbates the crisis of professionalism by denying its existence.
But the American Bar Association's revised rules seek not to solve the
crisis of professionalism, but to defuse it by fostering the impression
that the profession has once again vigorously improved itself. Indeed, the Model Rules carefully correct some of the ambiguities
and omissions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, the ABA's revisions come in a document, carefully and
moderately written, full of beguiling promises that the profession
exalts competence and service. Under the Model Rules, individual
lawyers who could afford to break away from group custom and practice would be liberated to do so, leaving those lawyers in the profession unable to afford the price of individual ethics, as well as
those who prefer the status quo, free to continue in the present
course. Because the Model Rules camouflage the crisis of profes72. MODEL RuLs, supra note 1, at Rule 1.7(c).
73. Freedman, supra note 49, at 1171.
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sionalism, they would also leave the legal structure the profession
serves less threatened than before by the possibility of change.
The Symposium that follows presents an opportunity to examine differences among the proposed revisions of the ethical rules.
It also, however, may lead one to acknowledge the shortcomings
of each proposal. In such case, the Symposium may also offer an
opportunity to begin to consider ways of achieving changes in the
profession significant enough to resolve the crisis of professionalism.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss6/2

16

